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Size, Non-performing Loan, Capital and Productivity Change:  
Evidence from in Indian State-owned Banks 
 
Introduction 
One of the major segments of the economy that has received renewed focus in 
recent times has been the financial sector. Within the broad ambit of the financial sector, 
the banking sector has been the cynosure of academia and policymakers. Among the 
various reasons attributable to the resurgence of interest in banking, the world-wide trend 
towards deregulation, ascendancy of free market philosophy and the growing number, 
breadth and severity of bouts of financial distress that have plagued several economies 
since the ‘eighties have been a dominant one. Such liberalization has raised a gamut of 
questions relating to the linkages between deregulation and the various categories of risks 
confronting the banking sector. With concerns about financial stability emerging to the 
forefront of policy challenges facing central banks worldwide, it is being increasingly 
realized that promoting healthy financial institutions, especially banks, is a crucial 
prerequisite. As a result, the traditional face of banking has also been undergoing a 
change-from one of mere intemediator to one of provider of quick, cost-effective, 
efficient and consumer-centric services. Not surprisingly therefore, the banking sector in 
most emerging economies is passing through challenging yet exciting times and India has 
been no exception to that rule. 
A process of liberalization of the economy was initiated in India since 1991-92, 
which aimed at raising the allocative efficiency of available savings, increasing the return 
on investments and promoting accelerated growth and development of the real sector. 
Towards this end, wide-ranging reforms were undertaken across the entire gamut of the 
financial system in order to promote a diversified, efficient and competitive financial 
system (Rangarajan, 1998).  
In the international context, there has been a considerable amount of research 
examining the productive efficiency for the banking industry for several countries, viz., 
United States (Bauer et al., 1998), Norway (Berg et al., 1992), Spain (Grifel-Tatje and 
Lovell, 1996), Thailand (Leightner and Lovell, 1998) and Korea (Gilbert and Wilson, 
1998). Not much evidence, however, has been forthcoming for the Indian banking sector 
on the interlinkage among non-performing loans, capital and productivity. It is widely 
recognized that India is one of the fastest growing economies in the present decade, with 
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the growth engine propelled to a large extent, by a vibrant banking sector (Jalan, 2000). 
At a time when the financial sector has been significantly liberalized, it is important to 
examine as to whether the productivity of banks has concomitantly improved as well. 
Such insights can serve as useful guide to policy makers towards understanding the 
efficacy of the reform process, particularly on the banking sector. 
Against this background, the present paper seeks to examine the 
interrelationships among risk, capital, productivity change and size of the state-owned 
banking sector in India. While the relationship between capital and risk, especially for US 
banks, has been extensively studied (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997)1 
and even their interrelationship with operating efficiency has been explored (Kwan and 
Eisenbis, 1997), not much evidence is available on their relationship with productivity 
change. There are reasons to believe that both risk and productivity might be 
endogenously determined, and such a situation is best examined in a simultaneous 
equation setup. In a recent study, Leightner and Lovell (1998) using two different 
specifications of the provision of bank services showed that total factor productivity was 
varied markedly under the two different objectives. Illustratively, when the direct 
objective of profit maximization by the banks was considered, factor productivity 
increased sharply; in contrast, when the indirect objective of facilitating growth while 
safeguarding safety and soundness of the banking system was taken into consideration, 
productivity growth exhibited a decline. Such differing objectives, not surprisingly, have 
differing implications for risk-taking behaviour by banks. Under the first scenario, risk-
                                                          
1 Shrieves and Dahl (1992) aim at determining the relation between capital and risk taking 
behaviour of banks. The changes in bank capital ratios and in portfolio risk are explained by 
discretionary adjustments and exogenous random shocks. The discretionary changes are thought 
of as reflecting (partial) adjustments to capital and risk targets. The relationship applies to 
adequately capitalized as well as undercapitalized banks, indicating that if there is no regulatory 
need, bank risk-taking is self-constrained (managerial risk-aversion). As for undercapitalized 
banks, their rate of adjustment was higher than that of adequately capitalized banks. Target capital 
is significantly affected by bank size (inverse relationship) only for undercapitalized banks. This 
may be because large banks feel less pressure to increase capital when they are undercapitalized 
(too-big-too-fail effect). Jacques and Nigro (1997) examine the impact of risk-based capital 
standards on 2,570 US bank capital and portfolio risk during 1990-91.Building on the framework 
developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), they incorporate among the independent variables proxies 
for regulatory pressure: the response of banks to the 7.25 per cent risk-based capital standards. 
Regulatory pressure, in their framework, is defined as the inverse of the banks actual risk-based 
capital ratio minus the inverse of the actual stipulated capital ratio (high regulatory pressure or 
RPH) and vice versa (low regulatory pressure or RPL). Their findings reveal that banks which had 
capital ratios in excess of the minimum stipulated levels at the end of 1990 responded to risk-
based capital by increasing their capital-asset ratios and reducing portfolio risk. On the other hand, 
even well-capitalised banks lowered their portfolio risk in response to regulatory constraints, even 
though the impact on capital ratios for these banks is not so clear cut.  
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taking tends to be dictated by the individual bank’s profitability considerations, which, in 
turn, will impinge on bank productivity. While in case of the latter, risk-taking will be 
largely governed by financial stability considerations of the central bank, and to that 
extent, will impinge upon productivity. 
From the standpoint of a developing country, the interplay among capital, risk 
and productivity might not be necessarily unambiguous. For one, banking systems in 
developing countries still tend to be predominantly Government owned, so that any such 
relationship needs to take cognizance of this fact. To provide an example, as at end 1998, 
share of State Owned Banks (SOB) in India were 82 per cent. The comparable figures for 
China, Indonesia and Brazil during the same period were 99 per cent, 85 per cent and 47 
per cent, respectively (Hawkins and Turner, 1999). Second, prudential norms also differ 
widely across countries, so that studies on such banking behaviour in one country might 
not provide consistent inferences about the same in another country. More importantly, 
even within a country, not all banks would be equally well placed to attain such 
standards. This brings into prominence the concept of regulatory pressure that a bank 
faces towards attaining such standards. Finally, several countries have directed credit 
programmes, meant to provide credit at concessional rates to the neglected sectors of the 
economy, so that any analysis would need to factor such considerations into account. 
More specifically, the aim of the study is to examine the interrelationships among 
risk, capital and productivity for the SOBs in India. In contrast to the standard 
intermediation approach or production approach towards determining various choices of 
inputs and outputs of banks, we follow Leightner and Lovell (1998) and Jemric and 
Vujcic (2002), in assuming that commercial banks have a profitability objective, while 
the central bank seeks to ensure soundness of the banking system, in addition to ensuring 
higher economic growth. This approach allows for the specification of two differing sets 
of inputs and a common set of outputs. Subsequently, we examine empirically the effects 
on risk and capital when banks either pursue their objectives in isolation or alternately, 
their ability to satisfy the objectives of the central bank.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a brief history of the 
financial liberalization and bank regulation in India are discussed. Section III describes 
the model specification. The discussion of the results is contained in Section IV. The final 
Section syncopates the concluding remarks. 
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2. Institutional Structure of the Indian Banking System 
In addition to Indian banks in the public and the private sectors and the Regional 
Rural Banks, the Scheduled Commercial Banking system comprises the foreign banks 
operating in India also. The two rounds of nationalization-first in 1969 of 14 major 
private sector banks with deposit liability of Rs. 0.50 billion or more, and thereafter in 
1980, of 6 major private sector banks with deposits not less than Rs.2 billion2- led to the 
creation of SOBs with nearly 92 per cent of assets as at end-March 1991. While there 
were several private and foreign banks functioning at that time, there activities were 
highly restricted through branch licensing and entry regulation norms. 
All commercial banks, whether public, private or foreign, are regulated by the 
central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). A process of liberalization of the financial 
sector was initiated in 1992, which aimed at creating a more diversified, profitable, 
efficient and resilient banking system, based on the recommendations of the Narasimham 
Committee on Financial Sector Reforms (1991). The underlying philosophy was to make 
the banking system more responsive to changes in the market environment and to that 
end, engendered a shift in the role of the RBI from micro-management of bank’s 
operations to macro governance.  
The reforms sought to improve bank profitability by lowering pre-emption 
(through reductions in the cash reserve and statutory liquidity ratios)3 and to strengthen 
the banking system through the introduction of 8 per cent capital adequacy norms, in 
addition to income recognition, asset classification and provisioning requirements in line 
with international best practices. Competition was promoted through entry of new banks 
in the private sector and more liberal entry of foreign banks. While regulations relating to 
interest rate policy, prudential norms and reserve requirements have been applied 
uniformly across bank groups, priority sector credit requirements are quite varied for 
different categories of banks. Illustratively, while state-owned and Indian private sector 
banks are required to allocate 40 per cent of their credit to priority sectors (comprising, 
agriculture, small-scale industry, transport operators, small business, etc.), the same for 
foreign banks was fixed at 32 per cent. These amounts, for both the state-owned/private 
and the foreign banks are inclusive of several sub-targets, the former comprising a sub-
                                                          
2 The number has since been reduced to 19, with the merger of two SOBs in 1993. 
3 As at end-March 2001, the cash reserve ratio was 7.5 per cent (statutory minimum of 3 per cent) 
and the statutory liquidity ratio was 25 per cent (the legal minimum). The corresponding figures as 
at end-March 1994 were 14.0 per cent and 34.25 per cent, respectively. 
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target of 18 per cent for agriculture, while the latter consists of a sub-target of 10 per cent 
for export4 and 10 per cent for small-scale industries. 
Until 1991-92, all SOBs were fully owned by the Government.5 After the reforms 
process was initiated, these banks were allowed to access the capital market to raise up to 
49 per cent of their equity. Till 2000-01, as many as 12 SOBs accessed to capital market 
and raised an amount aggregating Rs.64 billion. The management of nationalized banks 
is under the purview of the Ministry of Finance of the Government, which has its 
representatives on the Board of Directors. The management of State Bank of India, on the 
other hand, is under the RBI, which has its representative on its Board of Directors. As 
observed in the Narasimham Committee Report (1991), such a move has seriously 
abridged the functional autonomy of these banks and constrained their free and fair 
functioning. 
Evidence of competitive pressures on the Indian banking industry is evidenced 
from the decline in the five bank asset concentration ratio from 0.51 in 1991-92 to 0.44 in 
1995-96 and thereafter to 0.41 in 2000-01 and by the increasing number of private and 
foreign banks (Table 1)6.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The performance of SOBs has become more responsive to changes in the 
marketplace, with growing emphasis on profitability as an indicator of performance as 
opposed to non-commercial considerations in the pre-reform era. Illustratively, there was 
a distinct improvement in the net profit (from 4.6 billion in 1992-93 to Rs.51 billion in 
1999-2000). Reflecting the efficacy of the intermediation process, there has been a 
decline in the spread between the borrowing and lending rates as attested by the declining 
ratio of net interest income to total assets from 3.20 per cent in 1990-91 to 2.70 per cent 
in 1999-2000. 
 
3. The Model Specification 
The prior literature suggests that bank risk-taking might be dependent, among 
others, upon productivity change [Saunders et al., 1990, Gorton and Rosen, 1995]. The 
managerial discretion in risk-taking is partially dependent on the quality of management. 
As a consequence, an efficient bank with a superior management might be better placed 
                                                          
4 The number has since been revised upwards to 12 per cent in 1996. 
5 The State Bank of India (SBI) was fully owned by the RBI and the 7 associates of SBI were fully 
owned by SBI itself. 
6 The five largest banks (in terms of asset) were Government-owned till 2000-01. 
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in assuming additional risks vis-à-vis a less efficient one, ceteris paribus. This however 
needs to be tempered by the fact that an efficient banking firm, in an attempt to protect its 
franchise value, might be less inclined to assume greater risks than a less efficient one. 
The relationship is further compounded by the agency problems between management 
and shareholders. If, for instance, entrenched management is associated with low 
productivity, it is not altogether clear whether the relation between productivity and bank 
risk is positive or negative. 
At the same time, bank risk might impinge upon productivity. Risks may be 
costly to manage, since a high-risk firm might require more inputs to produce a given 
level of output as compared with a banking firm which assumes less risk. Put differently, 
while the attainment of a given level of productivity might be cost-effective, it might be 
difficult to increase the same, in view of the problems of high-risk loans that might creep 
into the loan sanctioning process. This, in its wake, implies a negative effect of bank risk 
on productivity. The nature of interplay between risk and productivity implies that it may 
be best modeled within a simultaneous equation framework. While studies examining the 
interplay between capital and portfolio risk have been considered in the literature 
(Shrieves and Dahl, 1992), little work has been forthcoming on the examination of the 
relationship between capital and credit risk and its interaction with productivity. 
Two sources of bank risk are considered in the study. These include, credit risk 
and leverage. Credit risk is the risk of default of the assets of the banking firm, consisting 
primarily of loans and Government securities.7 Leverage, on the other hand, refers to the 
amount of borrowing relative to the level of capital provided by shareholders. Since a 
banking firm can achieve a certain level of overall risk exposure by convex combinations 
of credit risk and financial leverage, these two types of bank risk are modeled as 
simultaneously determined. In the present study, credit risk is measured by the ratio of 
net non-performing loans to net advances (NNPA)8. Financial leverage, on the other 
hand, is measured by the ratio of capital to risk weighted assets (CRAR).  
The crucial issue in the context of measurement of productivity change in 
banking has been the absence of appropriate definition of inputs/outputs of banking and 
financial services. While the multi-product nature of the banking firm is widely 
                                                          
7 As at end-March 2001, loans and government securities comprised 78 per cent of total assets of 
SOBs. The corresponding figure as at end-March 1996 was 73 per cent. 
8 Net non-performing loans is measures as gross non-performing loans less (i) balance in interest 
suspense account, (ii) claims by deposit insurance and credit guarantee corporation and kept in 
 8 
recognized, there is still no agreement as to the explicit definition and measurement of 
banks’ inputs and outputs. Generally, each definition of input and output carries with it a 
particular set of banking concepts, which influence and limit the analysis of the 
production characteristics of the industry. One of the major difficulties in the 
measurement of bank output resides in the fact there is no consensus on how to define or 
measure these services. In broad terms, bank output should encompass the portfolio 
management and advisory services that banks usually provide to depositors in their 
intermediation capacity. Moreover, the absence of an explicit price also causes significant 
problems in the measurement of financial services. Without an explicit price, the value 
would need to be imputed. Whereas banks are viewed as producers of financial services, 
not all financial services constitute output. A fundamental difficulty arises in the 
treatment of bank deposits focuses on the input-output status of deposits. Broadly 
speaking, deposits were viewed as the main input for loan production and the acquisition 
of other earning assets. However, high value-added deposit products, such as integrated 
savings and checking accounts, investment trusts, and foreign currency deposit accounts, 
emphasize the output characteristics of deposits. Indeed, high value added deposit 
services are an important source of commissions and other fee revenue for specialized 
commercial banks. Accordingly, in these specialized institutions, the output nature of 
deposits cannot be overlooked. Deposits are thus “simultaneously an input into the loan 
process and an output, in the sense that they are purchased as a final product providing 
financial services” (Griliches, 1993: 222). This argument can be extended mutatis 
mutandis to hold that the classification of deposits should therefore depend on the nature 
of the financial institutions in any given representative sample and the regulatory regime 
of the particular nation. For instance, in the context of Indian banking the quantum of 
high value-added saving deposits is relatively small compared to time deposits, and there 
may thus be more reason to regard deposits as inputs.  
Two major methods have been developed to define the input-output relationship 
in financial institutions in the literature. In the first place, the production approach 
models financial institutions as producers of deposit and loan accounts, and defines 
output as the number of these accounts and transactions. Inputs are typically 
characterized as the number of employees and capital expenditures on fixed assets. 
Secondly, the intermediation approach focuses on the role of financial institutions as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
suspense account, (iii) part payment received and kept in suspense account, and, (iv) total 
provisions held. 
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intermediaries that transfer funds from surplus to deficit units. The approach to output 
definition used in intermediation approach was originally developed by Sealey and 
Lindley (1977) and posits that total loans and securities are outputs, whereas deposits 
along with labour and capital are inputs to the production process of banking firms. In 
contrast to production approach, intermediation approach has been more popular in the 
literature. One reason for this could be non-availability of number of accounts data at 
bank/branch level. 
In the Indian context, the commercial banks, and especially the public sector 
banks, serve manifold purposes. As a business entity, they have a profit-maximizing 
objective, while given the governmental concerns for ensuring allocation of credit to 
neglected sectors of the economy (e.g., small scale industries, agriculture, transport 
operators, small business, etc), they have to serve a social objective as well. The central 
bank, on the other hand, has a regulatory objective of fostering equitable economic 
growth, whilst addressing the concerns of financial stability. Accordingly, along with 
traditional intermediation approach, we have used some variation of defining 
inputs/outputs of banks in this study and have been essentially motivated by Leightner 
and Lovell (1998).  
As far the inputs are concerned, we have considered two different sets according 
as: (a) deposits, borrowings, fixed assets (capital), which is essentially considered in 
intermediation approach and (b) an additional input of provisions and contingencies 
along with (a). The additional input is intended to capture the cost of risk-taking, a 
recurrent problem of the banking sector in India. The selection of this variable is 
warranted against the background of the objective of the central bank of preserving 
financial stability as opposed to merely macro-stability in an earlier period. For outputs, 
we have assumed that commercial banks in India seek to maximize their profits. Towards 
that end, we specify a common set of two outputs as net interest margin and fee income; 
the former reflecting the gains accruing in the intermediation process, and the latter 
emanating primarily from customer services.  Accordingly, we estimate two different 
types of indices of productivity for each bank separately and denote them as follows: 
PR1: Productivity estimate with inputs as deposits, borrowings, fixed assets and 
outputs as net interest margin and fee income; 
PR2: Productivity estimate with inputs as deposits, borrowings, fixed assets, 
provisions and contingencies and outputs as net interest margin and fee income;  
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In order to mitigate the price effects, the relevant variables have been deflated by 
a uniform GDP deflator. Available studies in the Indian context reveal that public sector 
banks have less technical efficiency and a substantial portion of the output forgone is the 
result of underutilization or wastage of resources (Das, 1997). 
When one has panel data, as in the present study, one may use Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) like linear programming approach and a (input or output based) 
Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) index to measure productivity change. DEA 
involves the use of linear programming methods to construct a non-parametric piece-wise 
surface (or frontier) over the data, so as to be able to calculate efficiencies relative to this 
surface.  
Suppose we have data on K inputs and M outputs for each of N decision-making 
units (DMU’s). For the i th DMU, these are represented by the vectors xi and yi, 
respectively. The K x N input matrix X and the M x N output matrix Y represent the data 
for all N DMUs. Fare et al. (1994) specify an output-based Malmquist productivity 
change index9 which is defined as 
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Similarly, the other distance functions can be calculated.  
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In the present setup, NNPA, CAPITAL and PRODUCTIVITY (PR1, PR2) 
represent the three endogenous variables in each of the three equations. The model is 
closed by including exogenous variables that have explanatory power for each of the 
above endogenous variables. It is to these variables that we turn next. 
The NNPA is expected to be related to the composition of the loan portfolio, 
since different asset categories have different default characteristics. Therefore, in the 
NNPA equation, we include priority sector loans (as ratios of total loans) as a separate 
variable. Evidence in the Indian context seem to suggest that, for the SOBs, the share of 
non-performing loans obtaining from priority sector declined from over 48 per cent in 
March 1996 to around 45 per cent in March 2000 (RBI, 2000). Since loans to priority 
sector have been prescribed not to exceed the Prime Lending Rate (the rate charged to the 
borrowers of the bank with highest rating), it remains to be examined whether higher 
priority sector loans lead to higher NNPA. The effects of loan growth on the quantity of 
bad loans are controlled by using the one-year loan growth rate (ADVGR). To allow for 
the possibility of a U-shaped relation between loan growth and bad loan, the square of 
loan growth term (ADVGRSQ) has also been included as a separate variable to explain 
bad loan. In line with the analysis of Jacques and Nigro (1997), we introduce the concept 
of regulatory pressure both with regard to capital and NPAs. As regards NPAs, the Union 
Budget of the Government for 1998-99 provided certain functional autonomy to the 
SOBs with regard to their personnel management policies. An important component of 
the autonomy process included these banks having a NNPA ratio not exceeding 9 per 
cent, which we adopt as the benchmark for computing regulatory pressure for NPAs.  
Specifically, the regulatory pressure variable equals the difference between the inverse of 
the banks actual net NPA to net advances ratio (NNPA) and the inverse of the benchmark 
ratio of 9 per cent. Because banks with NNPA above and below the 9 per cent stipulation 
may react differently, this study partitioned regulatory pressure into two variables: 
RPHNPA and RPLNPA. RPHNPA equals (1/NNPA-1/9) for all banks with a NNPA not 
less than 9 per cent, and zero otherwise. These banks are under considerable pressure to 
lower their NNPA. Therefore, RPHNPA should have a positive effect on NNPA, because 
one of the options available to banks to meet the prescribed asset quality standards is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 The subscript ‘o’ has been used to indicate that output-oriented Malmquist index has been 
computed in our study. Note that input-oriented Malmquist TFP indices can also be defined in a 
similar way to the output-oriented measures presented in the present study (Grosskopf, 1993). 
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simply by cutting loan growth10. The reverse logic holds for banks with NNPA less than 
9 per cent. In this case, RPLNPA is defined as (1/9-1/NNPA) for all banks with NNPA 
not less than 9 per cent, and zero otherwise. Finally, the effect of economic conditions on 
non-performing loans (ceteris paribus, non-performing loans would tend to rise in bad 
times than in good times) is controlled, using time effect dummies.  
In the second equation, the level of capital is expected to be positively related to 
the profitability of the banking firm, owing to the plough back of earnings into reserves.11 
This suggests the Return on Assets (RoA) as a plausible explanatory variable to explain 
CRAR. In addition, we control for the effect of bank size on capital, by including the log 
of total assets (SIZE). In order to capture the effects of capital regulation, we include 
regulatory pressure variables, denoted by RPHCRAR and RPLCRAR. In particular, the 
focus is on the response of the SOBs to the 8 per cent risk-based capital standards12. In 
this case, RPHCRAR and RPLCRAR signal the degree of regulatory pressure brought 
about by the risk-based capital standards on capital ratio. Specifically, the regulatory 
pressure variable equals the difference between the inverse of the bank’s total risk-based 
capital ratio (CRAR) and the inverse of the regulatory minimum risk-based ratio of 8 per 
cent. Because banks with total risk-based capital ratios above and below the 8 per cent 
regulatory minimum may react differently, this study partitioned regulatory pressure into 
two variables: RPHCRAR and RPLCRAR. RPLCRAR equals (1/CRAR-1/8) for all 
banks with a total risk-based capital ratio less than 8 per cent, and zero otherwise. These 
banks are under considerable pressure to increase capital ratios. Therefore, RPLCRAR 
should have a positive effect on capital ratios, because one of the options available to 
banks to meet the prescribed capital standards is simply by raising capital.  
A second regulatory pressure variable, RPHCRAR equals (1/8-1/CRAR) for all 
banks with total risk-based ratio greater than or equal to 8 per cent, zero otherwise. 
Although banks with risk-based capital ratios in excess of 8 per cent are not explicitly 
constrained by the prescribed capital standards, it might well happen that the risk-based 
standards induce them to reduce their ratios (the opportunity cost of holding additional 
                                                          
10For banks with risk based capital ratios less than 8 per cent, (1/CRAR-1/8) was positive. 
Therefore, a positive value implies that greater regulatory pressure, as measured by RPLCRAR, 
correspond to larger increases in the capital ratio. A similar argument can be applied for 
RPHCRAR.  
11 In terms of Section 17 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, every banking company 
incorporated in India is required to create a reserve fund and transfer a sum equivalent to not less 
than 25 per cent of its disclosed profits to the reserve fund, every year. 
12 Upto end-March 1999, SOBs had to comply with a CRAR of 8 per cent. This ratio has been 
raised to 9 per cent effective April 1, 2000.  
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capital might be high). Alternately, since banks must meet the minimum prescribed 
standards on a continuous basis, the risk-based capital standards may cause banks to 
increase their capital ratios (additional capital might act as a cushion for some loans 
migrating into non-performance). More importantly, higher capital ratios might act as a 
signaling device, both to the market and bank regulators, that these banks are in 
compliance and in the process, lead to an overall reduction in regulatory costs. 
Finally, in the PRODUCTIVITY equation, we control for the effect of loan 
growth on efficiency by introducing two loan growth variables, ADVGR and 
ADVGRSQ. To the extent that a low to moderate growth rate captures managerial 
quality, while a high growth rate reflects managerial entrenchment, the relation between 
growth and efficiency might be U-shaped. Additionally, the composition of the loan 
portfolio as captured in the ratio of priority sector loans to total loans might affect 
productivity: since loans to priority sector are capped at the Prime Lending Rate, the 
opportunity cost of bank loans will vary depending on the portion of their loans 
dovetailed to this sector. Finally, to control for the effect of Government ownership of the 
state-owned banking system in India, we define a variable, GOVT, which takes the value 
one for that year (and for all subsequent years), if a bank has made an equity issue in the 
particular year and zero, otherwise. In other words, GOVT intends to ascertain whether 
the divestment of Government ownership in SOBs has had an influence on 
PRODUCTIVITY. If, for example, the relationship is negative, then one might surmise 
that Government ownership tends to improve the productivity of the banking sector. The 
reverse logic would hold good in case the relationship turns out to be positive. 
  The simultaneous equation system consists of three linear equations, 
representing the empirical model of the study. Accordingly, we postulate two sets of 
equations, wherein the first set is as under: 
),,
,,,,1,(1
DUMMIESEFFECTTIMERPHNPLRPHNPA
ADVGRSQADVGRPRIOLPRCRARfNNPA=
                              (3) 
),
,,,,1,(2
DUMMIESEFFECTTIMESIZE
RPLCRARRPHCRARRoAPRNNPAfCRAR=
                                       (4) 
),1,,,,(1 3 GOVTPRADVGRSQADVGRCRARNNPAfPR =                                   (5) 
where,  
NNPA=net non-performing loan to net advances; 
CRAR=capital to risk-asset ratio; 
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PR1=index of productivity as measured by profitability criteria; 
PRIOL= ratio of loans given to priority sector to total loans; 
ADVGR=annual growth rate of total loans; 
ADVGRSQ=square of ADVGR; 
RPHi,  (i=NPA, CRAR) and RPLi, (i=NPA, CRAR)=regulatory pressure variables with 
respect to asset quality and capital adequacy, respectively 
RoA=return on asset (defined as net profit to total asset); 
SIZE=log of total assets; 
GOVT=Government ownership, defined as a dummy variable which equals 1 in the 
particular year (and all subsequent years) in which the bank has made an equity offering 
and zero, otherwise; 
T=time effect dummy=one for year t, zero otherwise. 
In equations (3) and (4), PRODUCTIVITY tests the effects of operating 
performance on risk-taking. A high-level of productivity implies an efficient bank 
management, which under moral hazard hypothesis should not be willing to take higher 
risks. This in turn implies less bad loans, so the effect is expected to be negative. 
However, under the hypothesis that inefficient firms are subject to stricter regulatory 
scrutiny and consequently, have less flexibility to pursue riskier activities, 
PRODUCTIVITY could be expected to have a negative effect on NNPA and a positive 
effect on CAPITAL.  
Equation (5) examines the effect of risk-taking on productivity. Credit risk 
management involves controlling adverse selection problems by screening loan 
applicants as well as tackling moral hazard problems through closer and continuous loan 
monitoring. Depending on the efficacy of utilization of resources to manage the risk, the 
costs of controlling credit risk may increase with the level of risk exposure due to 
monitoring and hedging costs, implying a positive relation between NNPA and 
productivity. On the contrary, if costs of credit risk management decrease with the level 
of risk exposure (for example, due to credit screening), the relationship between NNPA 
and PRODUCTIVITY might well turn out to be negative. 
For the other model, ceteris paribus, we replace the variable PR1 by PR2 
reflecting the fact as to what extent commercial banks are able to internalize the objective 
of the central bank in their quest for profit maximization. 
 
4. The Data Set and Variables 
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Yearly data on SOBs from 1995-96 through 2000-2001 is obtained from the 
various issues of Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, the Report of Trend and 
Progress of Banking in India and the published annual audited accounts of individual 
banks. The reason for the choice of SOBs can be stated as follows. First, SOBs comprised 
between 80-85 per cent of the total assets of Scheduled Commercial Banks during this 
period. Second, the SOBs group is sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of geographical 
location of branches, product sophistication, technological orientation as well as their 
clientele base, so that a study of SOBs suffices to extract broad inferences about the 
interrelation between risk and productivity change for the banking sector in India as a 
whole. As it stands, the SOBs in India comprise of the State Bank of India (SBI) (in 
which the Reserve Bank of India is the majority shareholder), 7 associates of SBI (the 
majority holding being with SBI) and 19 nationalised banks (the majority holding being 
with the Government). The final pooled sample therefore comprises of 27 SOBs for the 
period 1995-96 to 2000-2001. The choice of the period is dictated by several 
considerations. The first is the availability of published data on the variables considered 
in the study. Second, owing to the construction of the one-year loan growth rate, the 
estimation period covers the years 1995-96 through 2000-01. Secondly, the year 1995-96 
marks the mid-point of the ‘first generation’ reforms programme initiated in 1991, so that 
it would be useful to examine the efficacy of banking policies on the behaviour of 
different bank groups half-way through the initiation of the reform process.  
In order to account for the heterogeneity within SOBs, the sample is broken down 
into three size classes, based on their total assets as at end-March 1996 (the first year of 
the sample period). The three size classes are defined as ‘small’, i.e., those with total 
assets less than or equal to Rs.100 billion; ‘medium’, i.e., those with assets exceeding 
Rs.100 billion, but less than or equal to Rs.150 billion; and finally, ‘large’, i.e., those with 
assets exceeding Rs.150 billion. This classification leaves us with an equal number of 
banks within each of the three category.13,14 In addition, separating the sample firms into 
                                                          
13 While there has been a movement within classes in terms of bank assets, there has been no 
movement from one class to another, so that this has left us with the same number of banks within 
each size class over the entire period. 
14 The banks within each size class in alphabetical order are: ‘Large’ (Bank of Baroda, Bank of 
India, Canara Bank, Central Bank of India, Indian Overseas Bank, Punjab National Bank, State 
Bank of India, Syndicate Bank and Union Bank of India,); ‘Medium’ (Allahabad Bank, Andhra 
Bank, Bank of Maharashtra, Dena Bank, Indian Bank, State Bank of Hyderabad, State Bank of 
Patiala, United Bank of India and United Commercial Bank,) and ‘Small’ (Corporation Bank, 
Oriental Bank of Commerce, Punjab and Sind Bank, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, State Bank 
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different size classes is also warranted by the overt focus on productivity change. The 
summary statistics across each of the three size classes as well as for SOBs as a whole for 
the estimation period is reported in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Among the bank-specific variables, it is observed that on average, banks in the 
medium category tend to have relatively higher non-performing loans than those in the 
other two size classes, whereas capitalization, on average, tends to be highest in the small 
banks. Of greater interest is the fact that small banks tend to have more priority sector 
loans than large/medium ones, with the latter making up the shortfall through other loans. 
While return on assets (RoA) tend to be larger for smaller firms, the same is however 
negative for medium-sized firms; attesting a U-shaped relationship between size and 
return on assets;. Among the productivity measures, it is found that in consonance with 
widely held beliefs, there is a general trend that larger firms, on average, have higher 
productivity, irrespective of whether productivity is measured in terms of profitability 
objective or alternately, profitability with stability considerations. As regards regulatory 
variables, while RPHCRAR tends to be higher for the small banks, RPLCRAR, on the 
other hand, is higher in the large banks. Since RPHCRAR identifies banks subject to high 
regulatory pressure, which would be the case for relatively undercapitalised banks, this 
would seem to suggest that a greater concentration of such banks in the ‘small’ category. 
A similar logic applies to the RPLCRAR variable. Finally, the regulatory pressure for 
NPA is high (RPHNPA) for the medium bank; the same is the lowest for large banks. 
This would seem to suggest that large banks are more efficient in pro-actively managing 
their bad assets vis-à-vis medium ones.  
  
 5. Results and Discussion 
In view of the interlinkages among the variables, standard OLS regressions might 
engender misleading inferences.  To obviate this possibility, we have employed the two-
stage least squares. The advantage of this method rests in the fact that it performs a two-
stage process: estimating a reduced form regression of the dependent variable on all the 
pre-determined variables in the system (stage 1) thereby obtaining estimates of the 
dependent variable and subsequently, replacing the dependent variable in the original 
equation by its estimated value (stage 2) and applying OLS estimates. The model is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of Indore, State Bank of Mysore, State Bank of Saurashtra, State Bank of Travancore and Vijaya 
Bank.  
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therefore ‘purged’ of its endogenous elements, providing asymptotically efficient 
estimates. In the present case, the simultaneous equations system is fitted by pooled time-
series, cross-section observations using 2SLS, separately for each size class. The results 
of the estimation procedure are captured in Tables 3-5, respectively. 
NNPA. The explanatory power for the NNPA equation in reasonably high, 
ranging from 88 to 95 per cent (Table 3). CRAR is found to have a significant and 
negative effect on asset quality for the small banks. This implies that for these classes of 
banks, relatively more capital (lower leverage) tends to be associated with less credit risk. 
To the extent greater financial leverage tends to have a positive effect on credit risk, the 
findings lend credence to the fact that the two types of risks tend to reinforce each other. 
Second, loans to priority sector do not necessarily lead to high NNPA, especially for 
small-sized banks. As stated earlier, loans to priority sector are subject to regulatory 
stipulation: banks have to advance at least 40 per cent of their net bank credit to this 
sector; the shortfall having to be dovetailed to bonds of select financial institutions. To 
the extent that small banks are not able to meet the stipulations, they tend to invest the 
same in risk-free bonds of select institutions, which would then imply an inverse 
relationship between NNPA and priority sector loans. Third, the coefficient on ADVGR 
is negative and statistically significant for large as well as medium banks, pointing to the 
fact that for these banks, loan growth has a negative effect on bad loans, possibly because 
of their superior credit risk management techniques. Juxtaposed with the fact that the 
coefficient on ADVGRSQ being positive for these two categories of banks, this finding 
suggests that the relationship between non-performing loans and loan growth is inverse 
U-shaped. As regards regulatory pressure, it is observed that RPHNPA is significant 
across all bank groups at conventional levels of significance. It seems that banks subject 
to high regulatory pressure as regards NPAs will attempt to ‘gamble for resurrection’: 
increasing their loan growth in order to raise profits, which in turn, might engender high 
NPA levels, implying a positive relation between NNPA and RPHNPA. On the contrary, 
banks with NPAs below the stipulated benchmark will possibly adopt a cautious 
approach as regards credit sanction in an attempt to curb fresh build up of NPAs, so that 
low regulatory pressure induces banks across all categories to reduce NPAs.  
The important aspect of the finding is with regard to productivity change. When 
the objective of profit maximization is taken as a surrogate for productivity, the results 
seem to suggest that higher productivity leads to a drop in net NPAs, especially for 
mediums-sized banks. The flexibility of medium banks in loan sanctioning and 
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monitoring implies that they are fairly able to manage their bad assets, reflected in the 
inverse relation between NNPA and PR1. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
CRAR. The explanatory power on capital equation is significant but with high 
variability, with the adjusted R2 ranging from a low of 30 per cent for SOBs as a whole to 
a high of 90 per cent for large banks. The coefficient on NNPA is negative in the small 
size class, reiterating the mutually reinforcing relation between credit risk and financial 
leverage. Bank size (SIZE) and CRAR tend to be negatively related for the small banks, 
attesting to the limited scale effects emanating from bank operations. Finally, 
capitalization is driven positively by RoA and is significant at conventional levels of 
significance only for medium and small banks.               
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Of particular interest are the regulatory pressure variables, RPHCRAR and 
RPLCRAR. Since RPHCRAR captures banks with low capital adequacy, which does not 
meet the regulatory minimum risk-based standards, they should have a positive effect on 
capital ratios. In Table 3, the parameter estimate on RPHCRAR is positive and significant 
for banks in the large and small categories, with the coefficient on RPHCRAR equal to 
97.213 and 142.809, respectively. This would suggest that large and small banks in the 
inadequately capitalized category are under considerable regulatory pressure to increase 
their capital ratios. At the other end, as regards RPLCRAR, the coefficient is statistically 
significant only for the ‘large’ category banks, the magnitude of the coefficient being 
equal to –2.142. This would attest to the fact that the large, adequately capitalized banks 
tend to lower their capital ratios in response to regulatory pressure. 
PR1. The explanatory power of the PR1 equation is moderate, the adjusted R2 
ranging from 21 per cent to a high of 28 per cent. In this case, the coefficient on ADVGR 
is negative and significant for all categories of banks. Thus, higher growth in bank credit 
tends to lower the productivity of SOBs in India. Even the priority sector loans for small 
sized banks recorded significant negative relationship with productivity. Finally, coming 
to the critical issue of Government ownership, the results support that productivity tends 
to improve with lower Government ownership, especially for the medium banks.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
On the other hand, when productivity growth is measured in terms of the ability 
of the commercial banks to satisfy the objectives of the central bank, the results of the 
analysis are presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8, respectively. The results of table 6 are 
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virtually the same as in table 3, with one important difference. In table 6, it is observed 
that higher productivity does not lead to a reduction in NPA, which was the case earlier, 
especially for medium banks. It might possibly be the fact that these banks are not able to 
successfully incorporate the objectives of the central banks, thus tends to incorporate only 
profit maximizing behaviour, so that the results turn out to be inconclusive.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In a similar vein, the results of table 7 virtually mimic the results of table 4. As 
with the earlier table, the mutually reinforcing interrelation between leverage and credit 
risk is evidenced from the sign on the CRAR coefficient for small banks, with the 
magnitude of the coefficient being the same as when profit objective is considered in 
isolation. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
As regards productivity, the results are fairly similar. Again, across all categories 
of banks, higher loan growth translates into lower productivity, clearly indicative of 
decreasing returns to loan growth on productivity change. Second, higher loan to priority 
sector leads to a drop in productivity, suggestive of the fact that commercial banks are not 
able to fully internalize the objectives of the central bank in their profit maximization 
exercise. Finally, increased government ownership tends to increase productivity, 
especially in the medium-sized SOBs. These results run contrary to Caprio and Martinez 
Peria (2000), who find increased government ownership as determent to the development 
of the banking system. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
6. Concluding Observations 
The purpose of the present article has been to understand the association between 
risk-taking and productivity in the state-owned banking system in India. As pointed out 
earlier, the SOBs are traditionally Government-owned and to that extent, it is deemed as 
essential to understand the relation risk and efficiency, especially in the context of a 
dominantly Government-owned banking system. While it is found that higher 
productivity leads to a decrease in credit risk, it has a positive effect on bank 
capitalization as well. This supports the fact that poor performers are more prone to risk 
taking than better-performing banking organizations. The positive effect of productivity 
on capital is attributable to regulatory pressure, especially for banks which fall short of 
the prescribed minimum capital adequacy standards. Finally, our analysis supports the 
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fact that efficiency, capital and risk taking tend to be jointly determined, reinforcing and 
compensating each other. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Banking Industry: 1990-91 to 1999-2000 
 
Year / 
Bank Group 
1990-91 1995-96 1999-2000 
 Pub. Pvt. Forgn. Pub. Pvt. Forgn. Pub. Pvt. Forgn. 
No. of Banks 28 25 23 27 35 29 27 32 41 
Total Deposits 
(Rs. billion) 
2087.3 94.3 84.5 3908.2 361.7 306.1 7373.1 1136.7 493.2 
Total credit 
(Rs.billion) 
1305.7 49.5 50.6 2075.4 219.3 225.0 3521.1 557.4 356.2 
Credit-deposit 
ratio 
0.63 0.52 0.60 0.53 0.61 0.75 0.48 0.49 0.72 
Share of           
  Total Deposits 92.1 4.2 3.7 85.4 7.9 6.7 89.1 12.6 5.5 
  Total Credit 92.9 3.5 3.6 82.4 8.7 8.9 79.4 12.6 8.0 
 Total Income 
(Rs. billion) 
240.4 10.35 15.32 536.65 71.78 74.99 909.00 141.57 103.28 
Net Profit  
(Rs. billion) 
4.65 0.38 1.46 -3.34 15.88 7.39 51.13 12.24 10.35 
SOBs. State-owned Banks; Pvt. Private Sector Banks; Forgn: Foreign Banks 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Mean values of the variables 
Variable Large Medium Small All 
Bank-specific     
TOTAL ASSET 10.645 9.598 9.097 9.780 
CRAR 10.18 8.263 11.462 9.968 
NNPA 7.726 10.975 7.674 8.792 
ROA 0.556 -0.0004 0.556 0.370 
ADVGR 16.645 14.609 17.546 15.933 
PRIOL 30.741 34.408 37.642 34.264 
Productivity  
PR1 1.222 1.223 1.116 1.187 
PR2 1.197 1.195 1.118 1.170 
Regulatory  
RPHNPA 0.004 0.020 0.006 0.009 
RPLNPA 0.032 0.029 0.061 0.041 
RPHCRAR 0.023 0.020 0.032 0.025 
RPLCRAR 0.081 0.019 0.003 0.034 
No. of Obs. 54 54 54 162 
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Table 3: Two-stage least-squares regression estimates: 
Dependent Variable-NNPA 
 Large Medium Small All 
INTERCEPT 3.762 * 9.511 * 31.057  9.904 * 
 (7.748)  (1.763)  (21.735)  (1.005)  
CRAR 0.121  -0.0213  -0.129 ** -0.099 * 
 (0.244)  (0.074)  (0.052)  (0.026)  
PR1 0.278  -1.995 ** -1.020  -0.820  
 (4.974)  (0.874)  (0.345)  (0.719)  
PRIOL 0.019  0.048  -0.222 ** 0.004  
 (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.227)  (0.014)  
ADVGR -0.045 *** -0.088 *** -0.077  -0.065 * 
 (0.023)  (0.050)  (0.087)  (0.021)  
ADVGRSQ 0.001 *** 0.003 * 0.001  0.001 * 
 (0.0007)  (0.001)  (0.0002)  (0.0006)  
RPHNPA 120.551 * 200.317 * 131.543 * 178.511 * 
 (40.910)  (17.155)  (17.843)  (6.410)  
RPLNPA -32.996 * -23.594 * -21.425 * -18.817 * 
 (6.700)  (3.427)  (5.795)  (1.079)  
T -0.098  0.060  0.125 ** -0.040  
 (0.195)  (0.166)  (0.061)  (0.045)  
Adjusted R2 0.883  0.951  0.911  0.957  
 Figures in brackets indicate robust standard errors. 
 *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Two-stage least-squares regression estimates: 
Dependent Variable-CRAR 
 Large Medium Small All 
INTERCEPT 5.390 ** 38.191 ** 13.237 ** 23.158 **
 (2.574)  (18.991  (5.001)  (11.866)  
NNPA -0.059  0.067  -0.126 *** -0.047  
 (0.064)  (0.232)  (0.076)  (0.239)  
PR1 -0.415  -4.139  2.802  -12.448  
 (1.098)  (4.057)  (2.519)  (10.393)  
ROA 0.553  3.114 * 0.485 ** 2.762 * 
 (0.423)  (0.899)  (0.187)  (1.087)  
RPHCRAR 97.213 * 36.732  142.809 * 48.585 * 
 (12.334)  (66.609)  (12.935)  (16.663)  
RPLCRAR -2.142 * -0.729  -5.252  -1.050  
 (0.197)  (8.362)  (7.419)  (1.516)  
SIZE 0.196  -3.049  -1.184 ** -0.261  
 (0.192)  (1.883)  (0.557)  (0.535)  
T 0.367 * 0.841  0.568 * 0.432  
 (0.075)  (0.592)  (0.141)  (0.300)  
Adjusted R2 0.901  0.589  0.852  0.308  
 Figures in brackets indicate robust standard errors. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
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Table 5: Two-stage least-squares regression estimates: 
Dependent Variable-PR1 
 Large Medium Small All  
INTERCEPT 2.184 * 1.158 * 1.891 * 1.657 * 
 (0.613)  (0.618)  (0.346)  (0.279)  
NNPA -0.022  -0.002  -0.015  -0.013  
 (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.012)  
CRAR -0.013  0.001  0.001  -0.022  
 (0.033)  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.015)  
ADVGR -0.021 * -0.017 * -0.005 ** -0.009 * 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.004)  
PRIOL 0.0003  -0.005  -0.015 * 0.0001  
 (0.0007)  (0.014)  (0.001)  (0.006)  
GOVT -0.284  -0.370 ** -0.012  -0.009  
 (0.180)  (0.196)  (0.067)  (0.074)  
Adjusted R2 0.286  0.274  0.247  0.252  
 Figures in brackets indicate robust standard errors. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
Table 6: Two-stage least-squares regression estimates: 
Dependent Variable-NNPA 
 Large Medium Small All 
INTERCEPT 7.254 * 8.563 * 10.869 * 9.922 * 
 (1.393)  (1.393)  (2.436)  (0.939)  
CRAR 0.014  -0.070  -0.086 ** -0.081 * 
 (0.046)  (0.055)  (0.042)  (0.028)  
PR2 0.369  -0.915  -0.386  -0.789  
 (0.646)  (0.794)  (1.037)  (0.606)  
PRIOL 0.024  0.044  -0.037  0.003  
 (0.016)  (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.015)  
ADVGR -0.046 *** -0.079 ** -0.057  -0.066 * 
 (0.023)  (0.046)  (0.035)  (0.022)  
ADVGRSQ 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.001  0.001 * 
 (0.0007)  (0.001)  (0.0007)  (0.0005)  
RPHNPA 139.779 * 190.922 * 144.250 * 178.757 * 
 (7.232)  (14.488)  (14.286)  (6.595)  
RPLNPA -32.176 * -23.724 * -17.664 * -18.928 * 
 (2.011)  (3.042)  (1.447)  (1.121)  
T -0.007  0.022  0.117 ** 0.015  
 (0.042)  (0.105)  (0.066)  (0.044)  
Adjusted R2 0.960  0.961  0.945  0.954  
 Figures in brackets indicate robust standard errors. 
 *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
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Table 7: Two-stage least-squares regression estimates: 
Dependent Variable-CRAR 
 Large Medium Small All  
INTERCEPT 4.398 32.727 ** 14.326 * 15.589 ** 
 (2.774) (16.461) (4.522) (6.429)  
NNPA -0.071 0.029 -0.148 ** -0.086  
 (0.052) (0.231) (0.069) (0.137)  
PR2 0.169 -2.849 1.093 -4.703  
 (1.242) (3.854) (1.371) (5.257)  
ROA 0.464 3.084 * 0.507 * 2.219 * 
 (0.408) (1.012) (0.177) (0.727)  
RPHCRAR 101.604 * 50.908 137.494 * 88.352 * 
 (14.747) (61.338) (11.206) (31.428)  
RPLCRAR -2.172 * 3.085 -5.620 -1.431  
 (0.193) (7.198) (6.922) (0.909)  
SIZE 0.228 -2.572 -1.050 ** -0.307  
 (0.169) (1.653) (0.497) (0.304)  
T 0.362 * 0.637 0.553 * 0.187  
 (0.079) (0.492) (0.135) (0.184)  
Adjusted R2 0.912 0.624 0.869 0.591  
Figures in brackets indicate robust standard errors. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
Table 8: Two-stage least-squares regression estimates: 
Dependent Variable-PR2 
 Large Medium Small All 
INTERCEPT 2.214 * 1.052 * 2.172 * 1.676 *
 (0.439) (0.600) (0.464) (0.282) 
NNPA -0.033 0.011 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) 
CRAR -0.021 0.009 0.019 0.018 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) 
ADVGR -0.018 * -0.013 ** -0.011  ** -0.011 *
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
PRIOL -0.022 * -0.023 ** -0.025 ** -0.021 *
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.006) 
GOVT -0.319 ** 0.371 ** -0.077 -0.024 
 (0.171) (0.202) (0.091) (0.078) 
Adjusted R2 0.321 0.276 0.264 0.281 
             Figures in brackets indicate robust standard errors. 
             *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
